February 29, 2012

Rights without borders – also known as human rights – have met their technological twin in the form of the global Internet, a technology without borders.

The Internet has transformed the reality of human rights by creating a space where communications can become universally participatory and truly flow in all directions, regardless of frontiers, instead of the previous situation in which information flows were largely top to bottom, flowing from content creators to content consumers.

The open architecture of the Internet creates a new global commons that facilitates and enhances many pre-existing human rights, including but not limited to rights of free expression, rights of information, petition, association and assembly, creative rights, and the right to earn a livelihood and contribute to the culture of society. Internet technology and design choices simultaneously extend human interaction in multiple directions regardless of borders, at a far lower cost, and on a more democratic basis than previously imaginable.

This powerful symbiosis between natural birthrights and the nature of the Internet as a rights-enhancing technology has caused discourse about the Internet to incorporate many lofty attributes that are further fueled by already being partially realized, causing (among other things) thought leaders regarding the Internet to sometimes be referred to as “evangelists.” Generally speaking, these rights-enhancing aspects have caused the Internet to reach the loftiest planes of human hope, joining democracy and religion at the level of promising “a more abundant life” for all, without the prominent downsides often associated with some actual implementations of government and religion.

The most powerful question to ask concerning human rights on the Internet is not where these rights arise from or how they may be further enforced in courts, but where any claimed “right” to interfere with the freedom of the Internet arises from.  How can such a right of interference with freedom of expression be legitimately theorized, asserted and enforced? Because the very nature of the Internet is to facilitate free expression, and given that the Internet as a whole is both owner-less and international, how can any single business, national government, or person obtain and enforce a right to interfere with the international freedom of the Internet? Any lack of clarity thought to exist by some regarding where human rights “come from” simply pales in comparison to the lack of clarity of any asserted right to interfere with the freedom of others on the Internet.  Any hypothetical “right to interfere” with inherent human rights of freedom of expression is far more difficult to justify and explain than upholding the natural human urge for self-expression and self-determination as a right.  Thus, absent highly exceptional circumstances, in a contest between interference and free expression, free expression always has the better case, regardless of whether free expression is thought of as an enforceable legal right or not.

By its very nature, the Internet makes possible the facilitation of universal free expression. Given that the Internet is both ownerless and borderless, no single business, national government, or person has a right to interfere with the worldwide freedom of the Internet. Any limit to the natural human right of freedom of expression has become far more difficult to justify and explain. Except in extraordinary circumstances that should be as narrowly defined as possible, restrictions to freedom of expression on and off line now seem even more illegitimate than ever.

Access to the full benefits and promise of the Internet can be interfered with or impeded at numerous levels and by numerous actors, including businesses, governments, individuals, engineers, web designers, administrators. Arguably, businesses are in the position to make more choices that actually or potentially impair or impede human rights on the Internet than government. Some “governmental” interference with the Internet is driven by business concern lobbying, such that much “governmental” interference can be attributed to businesses. Regardless of the relative amounts of responsibility one may assess to each, it is extremely clear that both governments and businesses can and are acting in ways that interfere with the Internet, either by failing to fully understand the Internet, or by pursuing narrow interests over the public interest as a whole. Any such government or business that acts to impair or impede the global freedom of the Internet should not be heard to claim that they “have the Internet” (in the case of a nation that filters or otherwise interferes) or that they “support the Internet” (in the case of a business acting in fact to impede access to the full Internet, or censor content, etc.)

The Internet can be interfered with or impeded at numerous levels and by many actors, including businesses, governments, individuals, engineers, web designers, administrators. Commercial interests are often better able to impair or impede human rights on the Internet than governments. Some ostensibly governmental interferences with the Internet are driven by business lobbying. In other cases, businesses may mask the reality that they are in fact imposing limits for political reasons dictated by governments. Regardless of their relative responsibilities, both governments and businesses can and have acted in ways that interfere with the Internet, either out of failure to understand its nature and technology or in pursuit of narrow interests. Those who interfere with global or local Internet freedom should not be allowed to claim that they act in its support.

Although Internet companies are obliged to abide by national legal rules of host countries, they are even more obliged to follow global human rights laws like freedom of expression than those national laws. Claims that domestic laws require business cooperation with censorship, etc. should be met with the assertion of higher laws and norms than those of a single country.

Although Internet companies must follow the laws of host countries, they are also obliged to respect universal human rights, notably freedom of expression. Claims that domestic laws require businesses to cooperate with censorship or other restrictions should be countered by invoking the obligations of national governments to honor the universal human rights texts that bind them.

In the general context of market freedom, the development of new technologies will always precede the question of the extent of their regulation. Yet, as human activity in the technology expands, some form of regulation is inevitable, just as it is impossible to imagine cities without any regulation, even though lack of regulation is possible in the countryside or wilderness. However, the pace of innovation and expansion on the Internet guarantees that no regulator can sufficiently keep pace. This requires deep commitment to human rights on the part of engineers and others who are creating the Internet in real time.

The pace of development of contemporary communications technology in a globalized free market seems bound to continue to outstrip the ability of regulators to keep up. Some regulation seems inevitable, given the complexity of modern societies. It will inevitably lag behind the pace of innovation and expansion of the Internet. This requires deep commitment to and understanding of human rights by the systems designers who modify the Internet environment in real time.

The pre-existing duty of all nations to support the diffusion of education concerning human rights takes on a special urgency and importance in the context of the Internet, because important structural and design decisions regarding the Internet will always continue to be made by Internet engineers and administrators at a speed and at a point in time where it is impossible for detailed guidance or best practices to exist. In direct effect, the “governance” of the Internet, in significant part, takes place in real time and in diverse places, often by engineers and programmers making design decisions, making a decentralized awareness and knowledge of human rights norms by people working on the Internet especially critical to preventing serious human rights issues from emerging. Knowledge about human rights, like the Internet itself, is a form of power that not only can be decentralized, but must be decentralized, given the diffuse points of potential impact on rights on the Internet, and the lack of any centralized ownership or control that can legitimately affect the whole.

The obligation of all governments to promote knowledge of human rights has taken on new urgency in the Internet era because basic structural and design decisions about cyberspace will continue to be made by Internet engineers and administrators at a speed that defies the possibilities of detailed policy guidance or adoption of best practice norms. Understanding of human rights must therefore be generalized so as to avert their inadvertent compromise.

Therefore, the IGC declares that the Internet is, and by rights ought to be, a place for the full expression of human freedoms and equality, the IGC condemns violations of human rights on the Internet and wherever else they may occur, and the IGC calls upon the United Nations and all people to support the utmost diffusion of education about human rights so that developers, engineers, administrators and users of the Internet can maximize the value of the Internet as an enhancement of the human experience for all people, making ever more real the human flourishing that is both the reality and the promise of the Internet, and doing so “without regard to frontiers.”

The Internet Governance Caucus of the Internet Governance Forum therefore declares that the Internet is, and by right ought to be, a place for the full expression of human freedoms and equality. The IGC condemns violations of human rights both on the Internet and elsewhere. The IGC calls upon the United Nations and all people to support the widest spread of human rights education so that those who continue to develop and use the Internet may maximize its ability to enhance the human experience and to turn into reality the promise of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to do so “through any media and regardless of frontiers.”

ENDS

The open architecture of the Internet creates a new commons that facilitates and enhances many pre-existing human rights, including but not limited to rights of free expression, rights of information, petition, association and assembly, creative rights, and the right to earn a livelihood and contribute to the culture of society.   Internet technology and design choices simultaneously extend human interaction in multiple directions regardless of borders, at a far lower cost, and on a more democratic basis than previously imaginable.

This powerful symbiosis between natural birthrights and the nature of the Internet as a rights-enhancing technology has caused discourse about the Internet to incorporate many lofty attributes that are further fueled by already being partially realized, causing (among other things) thought leaders regarding the Internet to sometimes be referred to as “evangelists.” Generally speaking, these rights-enhancing aspects have caused the Internet to reach the loftiest planes of human hope, joining democracy and religion at the level of promising “a more abundant life” for all, without the prominent downsides often associated with some actual implementations of government and religion.

The most powerful question to ask concerning human rights on the Internet is not where these rights arise from or how they may be further enforced in courts, but where any claimed “right” to interfere with the freedom of the Internet arises from.   How can such a right of interference with freedom of expression be legitimately theorized, asserted and enforced?  Because the very nature of the Internet is to facilitate free expression, and given that the Internet as a whole is both owner-less and international, how can any single business, national government, or person obtain and enforce a right to interfere with the international freedom of the Internet?   Any lack of clarity thought to exist by some regarding where human rights “come from” simply pales in comparison to the lack of clarity of any asserted right to interfere with the freedom of others on the Internet.  Any hypothetical “right to interfere” with inherent human rights of freedom of expression is far more difficult to justify and explain than upholding the natural human urge for self-expression and self-determination as a right.   Thus, absent highly exceptional circumstances, in a contest between interference and free expression, free expression always has the better case, regardless of whether free expression is thought of as an enforceable legal right or not.

Access to the full benefits and promise of the Internet can be interfered with or impeded at numerous levels and by numerous actors, including businesses, governments, individuals, engineers, web designers, administrators.   Arguably, businesses are in the position to make more choices that actually or potentially impair or impede human rights on the Internet than government.   Some “governmental” interference with the Internet is driven by business concern lobbying, such that much “governmental” interference can be attributed to businesses.  Regardless of the relative amounts of responsibility one may assess to each, it is extremely clear that both governments and businesses can and are acting in ways that interfere with the Internet, either by failing to fully understand the Internet, or by pursuing narrow interests over the public interest as a whole. Any such government or business that acts to impair or impede the global freedom of the Internet should not be heard to claim that they “have the Internet” (in the case of a nation that filters or otherwise interferes) or that they “support the Internet” (in the case of a business acting in fact to impede access to the full Internet, or censor content, etc.)

Although Internet companies are obliged to abide by national legal rules of host countries, they are even more obliged to follow global human rights laws like freedom of expression than those national laws.   Claims that domestic laws require business cooperation with censorship, etc. should be met with the assertion of higher laws and norms than those of a single country.

In the general context of market freedom, the development of new technologies will always precede the question of the extent of their regulation.   Yet, as human activity in the technology expands, some form of regulation is inevitable, just as it is impossible to imagine cities without any regulation, even though lack of regulation is possible in the countryside or wilderness.   However, the pace of innovation and expansion on the Internet guarantees that no regulator can sufficiently keep pace. This requires deep commitment to human rights on the part of engineers and others who are creating the Internet in real time.

The pre-existing duty of all nations to support the diffusion of education concerning human rights takes on a special urgency and importance in the context of the Internet, because important structural and design decisions regarding the Internet will always continue to be made by Internet engineers and administrators at a speed and at a point in time where it is impossible for detailed guidance or best practices to exist.  In direct effect, the “governance” of the Internet, in significant part, takes place in real time and in diverse places, often by engineers and programmers making design decisions, making a decentralized awareness and knowledge of human rights norms by people working on the Internet especially critical to preventing serious human rights issues from emerging. Knowledge about human rights, like the Internet itself, is a form of power that not only can be decentralized, but must be decentralized, given the diffuse points of potential impact on rights on the Internet, and the lack of any centralized ownership or control that can legitimately affect the whole.

Therefore, the Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus (IGC) declares that the Internet is, and by rights ought to be, a place for the full expression of human freedoms and equality, the IGC condemns violations of human rights on the Internet and wherever else they may occur, and the IGC calls upon the United Nations and all people to support the utmost diffusion of education about human rights so that developers, engineers, administrators and users of the Internet can maximize the value of the Internet as an enhancement of the human experience for all people, making ever more real the human flourishing that is both the reality and the promise of the Internet, and doing so “without regard to frontiers.”

Rights without borders – also known as human rights – have met their technological twin in the form of the global Internet, a technology without borders.

The open architecture of the Internet facilitates and enhances many pre-existing human rights, including but not limited to rights of free expression, rights of information, petition, association and assembly, creative rights, and the right to earn a livelihood and contribute to the culture of society. Internet technology and design choices simultaneously extends human interaction in multiple directions regardless of borders, at a far lower cost, and on a more democratic basis than previously imaginable.

This powerful symbiosis between natural birthrights and the nature of the Internet as a rights-enhancing technology has caused discourse about the Internet to incorporate many lofty attributes that are further fueled by already being partially realized, causing (among other things) thought leaders regarding the Internet to sometimes be referred to as “evangelists.” Generally speaking, these rights-enhancing aspects have caused the Internet to reach the loftiest planes of human hope, joining democracy and religion at the level of promising “a more abundant life” for all, without the prominent downsides often associated with actual some implementations of government and religion.

If the Internet, as a network of networks, is a great force for human flourishing, and if humans have the inborn desire to flourish under conditions of self-determination, the most powerful question to ask concerning rights on the Internet is not so much where these rights arise from, or how they may be further enforced in ancient courts, but where any claimed “right” to interfere with the freedom of the Internet arises from, and how such a right of interference can be legitimately asserted and enforced. Given that the very nature of the Internet is to facilitate behaviors often called rights and freedoms, and given that the Internet as a whole is owner-less and international, how can any business, government, or person both obtain a right to interfere with the freedom of the Internet, and also legitimately enforce that right? In this light, any lack of clarity deemed to exist by some regarding where human rights “come from” pales in comparison to the difficulties of coherently positing and persuading others of a right to interfere with the freedom of others on the Internet. To the extent such interference becomes known publicly, it will be highly likely to suffer the same fate as SOPA and PIPA legislation recently did, because any such right to interfere with inherent human rights and freedom is far more difficult to successfully theorize and explain than the human rights we all want for ourselves, but may or may not extend to all others equally.

Access to the full benefits and promise of the Internet can be interfered with or impeded at numerous levels and by numerous actors, including businesses, governments, individuals, engineers, web designers, administrators. Arguably, businesses are in the position to make more choices that actually or potentially impair or impede human rights on the Internet than government. Some “governmental” interference with the Internet is driven by business concern lobbying, such that much “governmental” interference can be attributed to businesses. Regardless of the relative amounts of responsibility one may assess to each, it is extremely clear that both governments and businesses can and are acting in ways that interfere with the Internet, either by failing to fully understand the Internet, or by pursuing narrow interests over the public interest as a whole. Any such government or business that acts to impair or impede the global freedom of the Internet should not be heard to claim that they “have the Internet” (in the case of a nation that filters or otherwise interferes) or that they “support the Internet” (in the case of a business acting in fact to impede access to the full Internet, or censor content, etc.)

Although Internet companies are obliged to abide by national legal rules of host countries, they are even more obliged to follow global human rights laws like freedom of expression than those national laws. Claims that domestic laws require business cooperation with censorship, etc., should be met with the assertion of higher laws and norms than those of a single country.

In the general context of market freedom, the development of new technologies will always precede the question of the extent of their regulation. Yet, as human activity in the technology expands, some form of regulation is inevitable, just as it is impossible to imagine cities without any regulation, even though lack of regulation is possible in the countryside or wilderness. However, the pace of innovation and expansion on the Internet guarantees that no regulator can sufficiently keep pace. This requires deep commitment to human rights on the part of engineers and others who are creating the Internet in real time.

The pre-existing duty of all nations to support the diffusion of education concerning human rights takes on a special urgency and importance in the context of the Internet, because important structural and design decisions regarding the Internet will always continue to be made by Internet engineers and administrators at a speed and at a point in time where it is impossible for detailed guidance or best practices to exist. In direct effect, the “governance” of the Internet, in significant part, takes place in real time and in diverse places, often by engineers and programmers making design decisions, making a decentralized awareness and knowledge of human rights norms by people working on the Internet especially critical to preventing serious human rights issues from emerging. Knowledge about human rights, like the Internet itself, is a form of power that not only can be decentralized, but must be decentralized, given the diffuse points of potential impact on rights on the Internet, and the lack of any centralized ownership or control that can legitimately affect the whole.

Therefore, the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) declares that the Internet is, and by rights ought to be, a place for the full expression of human freedoms and equality, the IGF condemns violations of human rights on the Internet and wherever they may occur, and the IGF calls upon the United Nations and all people to support the utmost diffusion of education about human rights so that developers, engineers, administrators and users of the Internet can maximize for all the value of the Internet as an enhancement of the human experience, making ever more real the human flourishing that is both the reality and the promise of the Internet.

We are fortunate that the Internet Governance Forum Secretariat and UN DESA are open .and committed to continued improvements to Remote Participation. Each year the IGF RPWG commences its operations with training of remote moderators many weeks ahead of the meeting, where they discuss with remote hubs and encourage participation and liaise with the Secretariat to make remote participation a reality.

We would like to reiterate and underscore that remote participation is a crucial part of organizing the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and we appreciate the effort to provide remote participation for the Open Consultation, the Multi-stakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) meetings, and the MAG meeting this month – February 2012 – which was opened to observers.

The IGC believes that Remote Participation (RP) should be an integral part of Internet Governance and IGF Policy Processes. It is impossible to sustain an inclusive global policy process without effective remote participation. We would like to explore how we can assist in working together to address the issues raised in 2008 by various stakeholders that have yet to be addressed¹.

The MAG and IGF Secretariats should start working with the host to ensure that real time transcriptions are available for all sessions and not just the Main Sessions.

We would like to commend the excellent work of the technical team from Politecnico di Torino, (The Polytechnic University of Turin) which was originally brought by our colleague and former IGC Civil Society Coordinator Vittorio Bertola.

However, we would like to point out some difficulties that occurred with the system during the open MAG meeting. On the third day, morning session, (the second day of the open MAG meeting), remote observers were effectively excluded because they had no access to live transcript.

Also MAG members trying to participate online had difficulty in contacting moderators, partly because the moderators were serving more than one function.

We strongly urge MAG and IGF Secretariats and ourselves to consider the following for the future IGF organizing work and the IGF itself, and work together to bring them about:

• Ensuring equal participation between online and offline participants through planning meetings to give online and offline participants an equal opportunity to participate and contribute to meetings.

• Ensuring that there is sufficient capacity and appropriate bandwidth to sustain remote participation by liaising with hosts well in advance to enable greater interactions from offline participants.

• Preparing a clear comprehensive guideline for remote participation and its moderation and post session or meeting reporting for meeting hosts, facilitators and chairs.

• Clearly advertising opportunities for RP in advance of all meetings, with clear guidance for participants on the opportunities to engage through RP that will be available.

• Always assigning exclusive remote participation coordinator/moderators (who do not have other jobs at the same time, and are responsible for interactions between the meeting’s physical participants/current speaker, the Chair and the remote participants).

• Establishing a clear procedure that would encourage remote participants to intervene. Such a system is desirable both for those physically present in Geneva and those observing the meeting remotely.

• Providing as much interactivity as possible by giving remote participants to interact and engage in meetings.

• Providing multiple methods – video, voice and text channel, as well as real-time transcription and video streaming – of coverage of the meeting

• Enabling the meeting and remote participation through interactive presentations access through RP.

• Creating a select Task force or Working Group created that has representatives from the Government, Private Sector and Civil Society that is dedicated to seeing improvements of Remote Participation and to ensure the incorporation of critical elements that have been highlighted to ensure improved remote participation processes.

Because only limited funds are available for face- to -face participation, this issue is crucially important to all stakeholders from all constituencies who are entitled to participate in the meetings, and who wish to do so from a remote location. Meeting Chairs also play a central role in creating a dynamic and inclusive environment that welcomes remote participation.

We also encourage greater partnership between the governments and private sector in enhancing remote participation.

We have to move beyond advocacy to listing and creating tangible outcomes to make improved, stable and sustainable remote participation a reality.

There are regions around the world where transportation is extremely expensive and one such region is the Pacific which has 22 countries and territories. Remote participation was the only way that any of these countries could access the IGF.

However there is room to improve processes and create an IGF culture where remote participation is prioritised through exploring tested methodology.

The appropriate technical solutions need also to be explored as well bandwidth and ensuring that there is uninterrupted power supply and redundancy options where backup generators are critical to maintain a consistent and seamless flow. The MAG and IGF Secretariats should also ensure that there is sufficient and dedicated bandwidth capacity to sustain the volume of traffic from remote participation.

Aside from having the appropriate technical solutions and should also include the following:-

• Outreach.

• Mapping local and regional stakeholders;

• Coordinating with people on the ground significantly before the IGF in a series of strategic roll out.

• Creation of Guidelines for Meeting Chairs and Moderators whilst noting the limitations.

• Identifying how the private sector, civil society and governments can be better involved in the remote hubs etc.

• Encourage greater collaboration between the IGF RPWG and national, sub regional and regional IGFs.

We also express our support of the IGF RPWG which published guidelines and recommendations for remote participation and IGF 2011 WS-67 participants prepared a draft of e-participation principles.

Ends

The IGC believes that Remote Participation should be an integral part of Internet Governance and IGF Policy Processes. It is impossible to sustain an inclusive global policy process without effective remote participation.

We would like to commend the excellent work of the technical team from Politecnico di Torino, (The Polytechnic University of Turin) which was originally brought by our colleague and former IGC Civil Society Coordinator Vittorio Bertola.

However, we would like to point out some difficulties that occurred with the system during the open MAG meeting. On the third day, morning session, (the second day of the open MAG meeting), remote observers were effectively excluded because they had no access to live transcript.

The  MAG and IGF Secretariats should start working with the host to ensure that real time transcriptions are available for all sessions and not just the Main Sessions.

Also MAG members trying to participate online had difficulty in contacting moderators, partly because the moderators were serving more than one function.

We strongly urge MAG and IGF Secretariats and ourselves to consider the following for the future IGF organizing work and the IGF itself, and work together to bring them about:

• Ensuring equal participation between online and offline participants through planning meetings to give online and offline participants an equal opportunity to participate and contribute to meetings.

• Ensuring that there is sufficient capacity and appropriate bandwidth to sustain remote participation by liaising with hosts well in advance to enable greater interactions from offline participants.

• Preparing a clear comprehensive guideline for remote participation and its moderation and post session or meeting reporting for meeting hosts, facilitators and chairs.

• Clearly advertising opportunities for RP in advance of all meetings, with clear guidance for participants on the opportunities to engage through RP that will be available.

• Always assigning exclusive remote participation coordinator/moderators (who do not have other jobs at the same time, and are responsible for interactions between the meeting’s physical participants/current speaker, the Chair and the remote participants).

• Establishing a clear procedure that would encourage remote participants to intervene. Such a system is desirable both for those physically present in Geneva and those observing the meeting remotely.

• Providing as much interactivity as possible  by giving remote participants to interact and engage in meetings.

• Providing multiple methods – video, voice and text channel, as well as real-time transcription and video streaming – of coverage of the meeting

• Enabling the meeting and remote participation through interactive presentations access through RP.

• Creating a select Task force or Working Group created that has representatives from the Government, Private Sector and Civil Society that is dedicated to seeing improvements of Remote Participation  and to ensure the incorporation of critical elements that have been highlighted to ensure improved remote participation processes.

Because only limited funds are available for face- to -face  participation, this issue is crucially important to all stakeholders from all constituencies who are entitled to participate in the meetings, and who wish to do so from a remote location.

We also encourage greater partnership between the governments and private sector in enhancing remote participation.

We have to move beyond advocacy to listing and creating tangible outcomes to make improved, stable and sustainable remote participation a reality.

There are regions around the world where transportation is extremely expensive and one such region is the Pacific which has 22 countries and territories. Remote participation was the only way that any of these countries could access the IGF.

However there is room to improve processes and create an IGF culture where remote participation is prioritised through exploring tested methodology.

The appropriate technical solutions need also to be explored as well bandwidth and ensuring that there is uninterrupted power supply and redundancy options where back up generators are critical to maintain a consistent and seamless flow. The MAG and IGF Secretariats should also ensure that there is sufficient and dedicated bandwidth capacity to sustain the volume of traffic from remote participation.

Aside from having the appropriate technical solutions and should also include the following:-

· Outreach;

· Mapping local and regional stakeholders;

· Coordinating with people on the ground significantly before the IGF in a series of strategic roll out;

· Identifying how the private sector, civil society and governments can be better involved in the remote hubs etc

We also express our support of the IGF RPWG which published guidelines and recommendations for remote participation and IGF 2011 WS-67 participants prepared a draft of e-participation principles.

In terms of its principal mandate, the IGF seems largely to be on its way to becoming a unique global forum for multi-stakeholder dialogue on Internet governance. However it is important, for this purpose, to keep up the on-going process of evolutionary innovation evident at each successive IGF meeting. To keep up the interest and engagement of stakeholders it is important that the IGF take up the most pressing global Internet governance issues and seek a policy dialogue on them, with the objective of such a dialogue helping processes of real policy-making in these areas. Overall, IGF’s success will be judged by how much it managed to influence these real policy-making processes. If this is taken as the central criterion of success, one can say that IGF is moving towards fulfilling its mandate, but not quite yet there. It needs to continue to pursue structural evolutions that (1) enable “effective and purposeful policy dialogue” on “issues that require most urgent resolution” and (2) strengthen links with institutions and processes of real policy making.

In this connection, the IGF must extend its effort to “facilitate discourse between bodies dealing with different cross-cutting international public policies regarding the Internet” (paragraph 72(b)) and “interfacing with appropriate inter-governmental organisations and other institutions on matters under their purview” (72(c)).

The IGF has also not been able to make any significant progress towards fulfilling its mandate under section 72(e) of “advising all stakeholders in proposing ways and means to accelerate the availability and affordability of the Internet in the developing world,” and section 72(g) of “identifying emerging issues, … and, where appropriate, making recommendations.”

The IGF has however, had considerable success in at least three areas:

1. Getting stakeholders with very different worldviews to begin talking with each other, and at least start to see the other’s point of view, if not accept it. This is a very important initial step because it is widely recognised that Internet governance requires new and different governance and policy models beyond exclusively statist ones.
2. Building capacity on a range of Internet governance issues among many newer participants, especially from developing countries with under-developed institutional and expertise systems in Internet governance arena.
3. Triggering regional and national initiatives for multi-stakeholder dialogue on Internet governance, and forming loops of possible interactivity between the global IGF and these national and regional initiatives.

Paragraph 72 of the Tunis Agenda, (a), asks the IGF to “Discuss public policy issues related to key elements of Internet governance in order to foster the sustainability, robustness, security, stability and development of the Internet.” There can be no doubt that this discussion is beginning to take place. The participation, the increasing quantity and quality of workshops, even the controversies that arise, are proof that this discussion is taking place. The continued interest in workshops is an indication that this process is still dynamically growing and needs to continue so that discussions may cover all aspects of the debate and include all actors, particularly in areas such as rights, inclusion and others, which have not been adequately addressed.

The Tunis agenda also calls for “development of multi-stakeholder processes at the national, regional level” similar to the IGF. As already noted, some national and regional processes are already taking shape. IGF should further encourage such processes and seek to establish formal relationships with these initiatives, including through IGF Remote Hubs.

2 Improving the IGF with a view to linking it to the broader dialogue on global Internet governance as directed by the UN General Assembly Resolution on “Information and communications technologies for development” (adopted on 24 November 2010)

A side-effect of the IGF’s reluctance to develop output documents, and to evolve processes suited to developing these, has been its relative insularity in the Internet governance regime. Other institutions of Internet governance are unable to consider any concise outcomes of the IGF discussions as inputs into their own deliberations. As such, the IGF, whilst not irrelevant to those who participate in it, has proved less relevant and significant to outsiders than it deserves.

This points to the need to create mechanisms to integrate the IGF’s outcomes into the programmes of other institutions. For example, just as at the Vilnius IGF meeting online moderators helped to bridge between online and offline discussions, so too there could be rapporteurs whose job it would be to summarise relevant discussions at the IGF and to forward them to external institutions, and to act as a proactive conduit for feedback from those institutions.

Ideally these summaries would include both main sessions and workshops, since much of the valuable discussion at the IGF takes place in the latter. Alternatively, they could be limited to the main sessions provided that a better mechanism for feeding the output of workshops back into main sessions is realised (this is explored in section 8 below).

A emerging model for this process (though other possible models may also be explored) is found in the “messages” or “recommendations” produced by national IGFs such IGF-D (Deutschland), and regional IGFs such as the East African IGF and EURODIG. Ideally this would become a two-way process in which the institutions addressed could also turn to the IGF with issues they wished the IGF to address through multi-stakeholder dialogue.

More detail of possible mechanisms for recording outcomes from the IGF process are considered in section 4 below, and more specific means of linking with other organisations dealing with Internet governance are considered in section 5 below.

3 How to enhance the contribution of IGF to socio-economic development and towards IADGs including enhancing participation of developing countries

To enhance the contribution of the IGF to socio-economic development and towards the IADGs, the IGF should identify the linkages between Internet governance mechanisms and development, and consider options for mainstreaming development considerations into IGF discussions and Internet governance processes, as appropriate.

To enhance the participation of developing countries, it will be necessary to establish a special funding mechanism by to help actors from developing countries to continuously engage in the IGF and related organisations and meetings. Fellowship works carried out by DiploFoundation, DotAsia Organisation, the Internet Society and other institutions offer a good reference for this, but they should be expanded to a larger scale. Targeting youth groups or the younger generation of professionals will have, in the long run, an effective impact.

Funding mechanisms for developing country participants must take into account clear criteria (for instance, age, gender and whether a particular group works with the marginalised people we want to bring to the IGF process). There should be an open opportunity to apply for funding, and opportunities should be published and disseminated widely. Transparency and timely decisions on funding decisions are also important.

Another way to enhance participation is by providing technical training to policy makers and policy training to engineers to help close the gaps between and within the under-represented and also even the well-represented. To differentiate between this capacity building role of the IGF and its policy discussion role, they should be clearly differentiated at IGF meetings, and perhaps the capacity building workshops held on a day before the main sessions and the more policy-oriented workshops begin.

4 Shaping the outcome of IGF meetings

The IGF should consider how to improve its orientation towards the development of tangible outputs. These may amount to “messages” rather than to recommendations, declarations or statements. The difference is that messages would take into account diverging opinions, and capture the range of policy options — however this should not preclude the IGF from developing processes that are better at facilitating a convergence of opinion through reasoned deliberation. Whilst consensus will not be achievable in every area, an important objective for a policy forum such as the IGF is to produce a high-quality reasoned consensus on policy issues where possible.

A first step towards the production of such messages or recommendations from the IGF is to create the necessary structures and processes for improved reporting from the IGF. This could include the use of a reporting template by workshops and main sessions.

Messages or recommendations could be based on:

• An overall chairman’s report (though this alone may not be a sufficiently inclusive process).
• Discussions in each session, compiled at the end of the IGF (though experience has shown that some session organisers can be lax in preparing such summaries).
• A repository of best practices discussed at the IGF (though in emerging policy areas, best practices may not exist yet, so the IGF’s outputs should not be limited to recording these).
• Discussions of thematic working groups (which would need to be created), to continue following the annual IGF meeting and be largely conducted online through open and inclusive processes.

Whatever form its outputs take, efforts should be taken to ensure that they are transmitted to relevant external institutions through appropriate mechanisms. Processes for efficient distribution of outputs to all relevant bodies and missions must be established. One method for such distribution would be the establishment of a rapporteur role such as that discussed in section 2 above, perhaps under the auspices of the MAG.

Finally, to ensure the effectiveness of the evolving mechanisms used for developing and disseminating outputs, the IGF should define ways to better capture the impact of the IGF,
such as through an annual report.

5 Outreach to and cooperation with other organisations and fora dealing with IG issues

As already noted in section 2 above, the IGF lacks a strong cooperative relationship with other Internet governance institutions. They do not yet recognise the value of the IGF’s contribution, in bringing multi-stakeholder deliberation to bear on pressing Internet governance questions. In particular, it is necessary to increase the influence of the IGF over decision-making bodies.

One concrete strategy to this end that could be immediately implemented could be to strengthen the link between the IGF and the CSTD, being the body with main responsibility for WSIS follow-up. Specifically, the CSTD should take into account inputs from the IGF when drafting its annual resolution. The IGF should then concentrate on developing similar links with other global decision-making bodies both public and private.

The IGF also has a watchdog role to play, pursuant to its mandate in paragraph 72(i) of the Tunis Agenda, wherein it can review and ensure the accountability of all fora involved in Internet governance. This could also be the specific responsibility of a new multi-stakeholder working group within the IGF, reporting to the MAG.

6 Inclusiveness of the IGF process and of participation at the IGF meetings (in particular with regard to stakeholders from developing countries)

Improving the inclusiveness of the IGF requires three main strategies to be addressed:

• Capacity building.
• Outreach.
• Remote participation.

Capacity building should focus on institutional capacity (eg. governments, civil society organizations), rather than on individual capacity. Some suggestions in this regard have been given above in section 3 above.

The IGF should develop an outreach strategy to include in the IGF processes groups that have not yet been included, from civil society, small and medium sized companies,
decision-makers, parliamentarians and youth. This should involve the production of a roadmap to identify key-players in each region that need to be included. Such an exercise could also assist the IGF to understand the real barriers for participation.

Integral to this is the issue of funding for developing country participants (especially to developing country policy makers), which has also been addressed already in section 3
above.

Remote participation is a vital feature of an inclusive IGF, and should be formally recognised as an integral part of the IGF. Basic features to be supported are that all IGF meetings, MAG meetings and open consultations should be webcast,
recorded and captioned, and options for remote participation put in place. This must include not only participation that is simultaneous with the annual meeting itself, but also asynchronous participation that is not dependent on the timezone of the participant.

The tools and techniques used to enhance remote participation should give participants the opportunity to effectively influence agenda-setting and IGF debates. Too often,
the undue emphasis on real-time discussion at the IGF means that remote participation comes too late to be relevant to the IGF’s proceedings. This can be avoided by re-conceptualising the IGF as an ongoing global process that takes full advantage of online networking. By the same token, the participation of remote speakers should also be encouraged.

To achieve the necessary level of remote participation, resources must be provided. To date, the resources that have been poured into the annual meeting have been disproportionate compared to those devoted to remote participation – which has a much greater inclusive potential. There has been an over-reliance placed on volunteer effort, which the IGF has been very fortunate to receive. Neither has there been any effective outreach or support to the administrators of other Web sites and popular online fora that comment on IGF or broader Internet governance issues, and could supplement the IGF’s own efforts to include the community in its work.

7 Working methods of the IGF, in particular improving the preparation process modalities

Much has been said about the need for the IGF to interface in a useful way with external policy makers, but the IGF’s working methods were not originally developed in a way that readily advances this aim. Focussed reform to the IGF’s institutional machinery will be required to improve its capacity to contribute to Internet governance policy making processes.

7.1 Current modalities: open consultation and MAG

The open consultation meetings could be improved by:

• Seeking the inputs of national and regional IGFs regarding the issues to be discussed in open consultations,
  especially the agenda. The MAG could take responsibility for this.
• Organisations that are part of the Internet governance ecosystem could be invited to share a one-page document regarding their suggestions on specific thematic issues. This will improve the inputs that go into the IGF and this is important if the IGF is expected to serve as a clearinghouse.
• At least one of the open consultations should take place as an online meeting.

The MAG also requires reform, both in its composition and its working methods. On the former count, the MAG needs to become become more accountable to its constituents. This may involve moving on from the existing “black box” approach whereby the United Nations Secretary General selects MAG members from a range of nominees put forward by various parties,
pursuant to selection criteria that are not published.

An alternative approach is the selection of MAG representatives through a bottom-up process driven by the stakeholder groups, subject to appropriate criteria to ensure regional and gender balance and a diversity of viewpoints.

In particular, civil society has been under represented in the MAG to date. This anomaly should be corrected in this round of rotation and a fair balance of members among all stakeholders assured. Fair civil society representation is necessary to ensure legitimacy for this new experiment in global governance. We agree that the organisations having an important role in Internet administration and the development of Internet-related technical standards should continue to be represented in the MAG. However, their representation should not be at the expense of civil society participation.

Another reform that might be considered is to rescind the special privileges that representatives of intergovernmental organisations, and special advisors to the chair, currently possess. If the MAG’s processes are opened to broader oversight by the community, such special privileges would soon become redundant.

It is also very important that the established process by which one-third of the MAG members are rotated each year is executed methodically, so that the composition of the MAG is completely refreshed every three years. Without this, it is too easy for the MAG to be captured by particular interest groups and for under-performing members to hold the MAG back.

As to the working methods of the MAG, more significant reform of should be considered to assist the IGF to fulfil its mandates in “interfacing,” “advising,” “identifying issues,” “giving recommendations” etc. Specifically, the MAG could be more effective if it worked through thematic and functional working groups (some of which have already been identified above). These working groups should prepare for each main session and the set of workshops connected to this main session. Working groups can also be used for managing internal tasks of the MAG more effectively. It could thus be strengthened and enabled to take on a more effective role in reporting, and in facilitating substantial discussions throughout the year.

7.2 IGF Secretariat

The autonomy of the Secretariat should be a paramount consideration. It should remain convened by the UN Secretary General, with an independent budget and a Secretariat under contract with the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). This provides it with a formal link to the UN system, which is important to ensure the continued participation of governments in the IGF.

The Secretariat should not be subsumed into any other functional UN organisation or process, because this could jeopardise its perceived independence, and could introduce new impediments to the continuation and development of the informal and open processes that the IGF has innovated.

The Secretariat should also strive to improve its transparency and its responsiveness to stakeholders. Very often emails to the Secretariat are not returned, and suggestions made by stakeholders are not specifically responded to. Whilst maintaining its strict neutrality, the Secretariat should also be proactive in facilitating the IGF’s evolution and should make statements that detract from the breadth of the IGF’s mandate in the Tunis Agenda.

8 Format of the IGF meetings

The IGF’s main sessions should be focused on specific issues concerning the conduct of Internet governance per se, rather than on more broadly framed issues pertaining to the Internet environment generally.

This requires a willingness to reconsider the current structures and processes that may have seemed necessary at the time of the IGF‚s inception but which may now be reconsidered in light of current practices, technology support opportunities, changed international financial and environmental conditions and so on. For example, it may be appropriate for the Internet Governance Forum to be reconceived from a single face-to-face meeting. Rather, the IGF might consider how other Internet governance institutions such as the IETF and ICANN,
conduct their work and engagement between meetings in online and regional fora, and for which global face-to-face meetings are a capstone for the work done elsewhere rather than the single element in the process.

Similarly, attention must be given to the effectiveness of the IGF’s intersessional work program, which is currently limited to open consultations, MAG meetings, dynamic coalition meetings, and loosely connected national and regional meetings. In particular, there should be a better mechanism than at present for these other groups and meetings to present their outputs to the IGF as a whole. This would require the IGF to set more stringent standards for such groups and meetings, including open membership, democratic processes, and perhaps multi-stakeholder composition.

Concretely, main sessions could be improved by means such as the following:

• Focusing on public policy issues and controversial issues, rather than technical details and innovations.
• Fostering periodical meetings with the participation of the organisers of national and regional IGFs.
• Setting aside a budget for inviting speakers to main sessions. Invitations to speak should be based on expertise,
  not on who is already attending the IGF.
• Identifying key global policy areas that require attention early in the year, creating working groups around these areas and sharing background material to be discussed in sessions throughout the year (at thematic meetings and/or online).
  They can then be discussed in a more in-depth way at the IGF.
• Following up from main sessions online, with the help of dedicated working groups for each issue area, who can help in the development of a community-driven conclusion document (recording consensus or otherwise) as a concrete output from the session.

Workshops could be improved by considering the following suggestions:

• Creating a mechanism for improved, stronger links between the workshops and the main sessions.
• Scheduling the two first days of the IGF for workshops and the two last days dedicated to main sessions, best practices fora and roundtables.
• Giving stricter obligations to the workshop organisers, in line with the idea of the feed to the main session,
  to provide summaries of the workshops directly to the main sessions and also to the whole outcome of the IGF.
• Developing a template for the proposal of workshops. It would make evaluation of the proposals easier and would allow limiting by default the number of speakers.
• Stricter evaluation of the workshop proposals,
  including a reduction of the number of panellists.
• Participants should be able to give feedback and evaluate the workshops they attended online.
• Conducting wrap-up workshops that would summarise discussions carried out in several workshops and forward an input to the main session.

9 Financing the Forum (exploring further options for financing)

9.1 Review of the current situation

We congratulate the IGF secretariat on doing exemplary work in the last few years, on a very thin resource base, and in difficult conditions where different stakeholder groups involved in the IGF have very different orientations and expectations of the secretariat. A lot of the IGF secretariat’s work is indeed path-breaking in the UN system.

However, it is very evident that the secretariat needs much better resource support that they have at present, if we are to fulfil all our expectations from this unique global institution. The Secretariat should be provided with resources needed to perform its role effectively.

Further, as noted in section 6 above, perhaps with the exception of webcasting, remote participation mechanisms have not been well resourced to date. This has limited the ability of the IGF to reach out to affected online communities around the world.

9.2 Options for ensuring predictability, transparency and accountability in financing IGF

As a global policy related institution it is important for the IGF to have stable public funding, and to insulate itself against any possibility of special interests influencing its working through control over funding. Such funding should not only enable appropriate and streamlined functioning of the IGF secretariat, the annual event and other proposed and inter-sessional activities, it should also be used to ensure equity in participation in the IGF across geographies and social groups.

The United Nations needs to recognise that the IGF is the outcome of a UN process and should ensure that it has the resources it needs to fulfill its mandate as defined at the Tunis Summit in 2005. A significant source of funding should be public funding through the UN. Donations from other donors from any stakeholder group should also be facilitated, but a public register of such donations should be maintained so that the IGF’s neutrality is not questioned.

In addition, as noted in section 3 above, a fund should be established to support the participation of people from developing and least developed countries in the IGF annual meetings and the IGF preparatory consultations.

Open Internet (or Network Neutrality) describes an ideal in which the openness of the Internet to the broadest possible range of commercial and non-commercial content, applications and services is maintained.  An open Internet is one that supports development, promotes Access to Knowledge, and resists perpetuating the power of old media and telecommunications empires on the new network.

With the explosion of Internet usage in the developing world mainly occurring on mobile networks, it is particularly important to consider how the ideal of open Internet will apply in the mobile space.  Should different rules apply for mobile and wired Internet networks?  If so, how can communications rights and Access to Knowledge be preserved for those users, in order to avoid an ongoing information divide?

In proposing this topic for the Nairobi IGF, we want to particularly ensure that it does not shy away from areas of disagreement.  Only by including panelists with divergent views on this topic can the very real and practical Internet governance disputes in this area be adequately and productively aired.

2. Cross border Issues

One of the oldest and thorniest issues for Internet governance concerns the cross-border effects of national laws, policies, enforcement practices, and the actions of intermediaries, on those who have had no representation in the making of those laws, policies, etc.  Current examples include actions taken by governments and intermediaries against Wikileaks, and the “seizure” of domain names alleged to be connected with content piracy.

The process towards enhanced cooperation on Internet policy issues could lead to new proposals that would address some of these cross-border anomalies and deficits.  But at this stage of that process, there is little shared understanding of the approach that should be taken.  This session will look at the philosophical underpinnings and foundations that need to emerge in a world where something like the Internet transcends boundaries and national jurisdictions.  Insights produced through this session may feed into the enhanced coperation process.

Once again, it will be important for discussion of this topic to involve stakeholders with diverging views, discussing concrete issues that demand eventual resolution.

3. Development agenda for Internet governance

Internet governance is not a neutral activity. All Internet governance decisions have implications for development, though in some cases these implications may be less obvious than in others, and they are easily overlooked.

An example is the way in which decisions about such diverse issues as new global top level domains (gTLDs), Unicode, IP enforcement, filtering and censorship, may have an adverse and sometimes unforeseen impact on Access to Knowledge in the developing world.

We propose a main session theme on developing a development agenda for Internet governance, building on the similar session in Vilnius.  This session will help to draw out areas of Internet governance which have significant impacts on development, and to suggest how development concerns can be mainstreamed in Internet governance institutions that have responsibility in these areas.

4. Access to knowledge

Access to knowledge is part of the great promise of the Internet in aiding development, education and culture both within and between countries.

However, new international standards require countries to increase the level and territorial extent of intellectual property rights. This trend has developmental impacts, as countries become less free to support open platforms for learning, innovating, sharing and producing, while being required to raise the amount spent on knowledge-based inputs.

Rather than substantive law harmonization, international IP norm-setting is now promoting an enforcement agenda, an increasingly punitive response to counterfeiting and piracy now being discussed in many national and international institutions. Often this puts Internet Service Providers in the position of an “Internet police”, with the role to oversight internet users.

Governance of knowledge and Internet governance become deeply intertwined in the context of an information society. The debate of this theme in a multistakeholder forum, such as the IGF, would help to reach a more round understanding about the impacts of this agenda on issues such as access to knowledge, and the ability to innovate online.

In its early days, the Internet was a model of decentralised, voluntary self-governance. When Internet content abuses occurred – for example by posting of spam to newsgroups – the community would respond with its own social and technical countermeasures. Into this self-regulated domain, governments have since stepped. Some, for example, have passed laws to control spam, which with varying effectiveness now supplement  – but do not supplant – the social and technical means by which the Internet community continues to self-govern.

But because of the Internet’s inherently trans-border architecture, the uncoordinated application of national laws is rarely adequate for the regulation of Internet content. More importantly, because individual governments do not represent trans-border communities, the attempted use of such laws to control global flows of Internet content is not democratically legitimate. Still less legitimate by far is their arbitrary and extra-legal use of political and economic power, as we have seen directed against Wikileaks.

This is not to say that the Internet community’s governance methods are necessarily any more legitimate; far from it, in the case of the retributive anonymous attacks of hackers against those who targeted Wikileaks. In truth governments, business, and Internet users alike have responded to the Wikileaks affair in an unjust arbitrary and unaccountable fashion in this game-changing cyber-war.

What is needed is a framework of principles for the Internet governance, which would guide all stakeholders in dealing with trans-border issues such as of Internet content regulation (as well as other trans-border issues), and provide incorporating democratic accountability and mechanisms of redress. This framework would comply with existing human rights standards including the rule of law, and be developed through an open, democratic process fully inclusive of all stakeholders from civil society, the private sector and government, the private sector, and civil society.

Oddly enough,It so happens that this is exactly what the IGC has been calling for something like this for yearssince about 2003. It is also what WSIS, a global summit of governments, also called for something similar in 2005 when directing the United Nations Secretary General to start a “process towards enhanced cooperation involving all stakeholders” (Tunis Agenda para 71) to address the “many cross-cutting international public policy issues that require attention and are not adequately addressed by the current mechanisms” (Tunis Agenda para 68).

What is perhaps most scandalous sad about the Wikileaks case is that it has taken a global diplomatic crisis to turn the international community’s attention back to what it committed to achieve five years ago. The IGC hopes that it doesn’t take another five years before this enhanced global democratic framework of governance for the Internet finally takes shape.